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"He that maketh haste to be rich shall not be innocent"
Proverbs 28:20
King David would probably fare well today in counseling own-
ers and prospective purchasers of real estate and corporations. In-
nocence has achieved a high value as a defense to the rigors of
liability for cleanup of hazardous waste sites under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, as amended1 (CERCLA, or Superfund). That liability is
strict, retroactive to time immemorial, and may be joint and several.
For that reason, there are some who would consider innocence to be
more valuable as a defense than a virtue.
The ability of a landowner to establish that it is an innocent
purchaser of property, when that property is found to be contami-
nated by hazardous substances, has assumed a high degree of im-
portance in real estate and corporate transactions. It is an issue
which will be raised with increasing frequency as corporations and
persons who have acquired real estate without knowledge of its con-
taminated condition or claims by the U.S. Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, state agencies, and private parties are asked to pay for
the cleanup of that property.
This article discusses:
* the statutory basis for liability of owners of contaminated
real property;
* the statutory defense and settlement procedure available to
owners who purchased the property without knowledge of
its environmental condition;
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1. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
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* recent cases interpreting the "innocent landowner" defense;
* a proposed statutory amendment to clarify the innocent
landowner defense;
* EPA's recently-issued guidance document on the innocent
landowner defense; and
* recommended procedures to avoid liability and establish
the innocent landowner defense.
Landowners' Liability Under CERCLA
CERCLA section 107(a)2 imposes strict liability for cleanup of
hazardous substances on, among others, the present owners of the
property on which the substances are found, as well as former own-
ers who owned the property at the time of disposal or release of
those hazardous substances. The term "owner" is defined as simply
"any person owning.., such facility," but specifically includes per-
sons who owned facilities immediately before transfer of those facil-
ities to a unit of state or local government by bankruptcy,
foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or similar means.3
A number of classes of persons are exempt from the definition
of "owner. ' '4 They include the so-called "secured creditor" exemp-
tion, under which a person who, without participating in the man-
agement of a facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to
protect his security interest in the facility, is exempt from the defini-
tion of "owner." In addition, "owner" does not include a unit of
State or local government which acquired title involuntarily
through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other invol-
untary acquisition by virtue of its function as sovereign, unless the
governmental unit has caused or contributed to a release or threat
of release of hazardous substances from the facility.'
Landowner Defenses to or Limitations on Liability
There is a statutory defense to CERCLA liability available
under CERCLA section 107(b)(3)6 to landowners who claim to
have purchased contaminated property without knowledge of the
contamination. If the owner can meet the requirements of this sec-
2. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
3. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A).
4. CERCLA § 101(20)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A). For an in-depth discussion of
the Secured Creditor Exemption from CERCLA liability, see Mays, Secured Creditors and
Superfund: Avoiding the Liability Net, 20 ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTER (BNA), No. 13, at
609 (July 28, 1989).
5. CERCLA § 101(20)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3).
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tion, liability may be avoided altogether. There is also a second
statutory provision (CERCLA section 122(g)(1)(B))7 which does
not rise to the level of a defense, but allows the owner to use his
innocence as a mitigating circumstance to minimize liability as a
"de minimis" party. Innocent purchasers who cannot meet all of
the requirements to earn the cloak of the absolute defense may, as
an alternative, attempt to claim the limited protection of section
122(g).
The Section 107(b)(3) Defense
The defense to liability is found in section 107(b)(3), which
provides in relevant part:
(b) There shall be no liability... for a person otherwise liable
who can establish ... that the release or threat of release of a
hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were
caused solely by:
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than... one whose
act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual relation-
ship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant [Le., the
landowner], if the defendant establishes.., that (a) he exercised
due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned...
in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any third
party and the consequences that could foreseeably result from
such acts or omissions. (Emphasis supplied).
There are three elements contained in this section necessary to
the defense that the contamination was caused solely by a third
party: (1) there must be no direct or indirect relationship, contrac-
tual or otherwise, between the landowner/defendant and the third
party; (2) the landowner must have exercised due care regarding
the hazardous substances upon their discovery; and (3) the land-
owner must show that he took precautions against the acts or omis-
sions of the third party. Because most of the attention given to this
subject has focused on the first element, it is easy to forget about the
latter two. However, some cases have turned on them, as we shall
see.
The threshold question is whether "contractual relationship"
includes deeds, leases, and other instruments of conveyance or
transfer of interest in real estate. The answer to that question is
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(1)(B).
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provided in section 101(35)(A)8 , which states that the term "con-
tractual relationship" includes, but is not limited to land contracts,
deeds, or other instruments transferring title or possession. Thus,
as the owner of property contaminated by a third party, the previ-
ous owner is liable for the cost of cleanup of the property.
However, section 101(35)(A) provides an exception to the lia-
bility created by that contractual relationship under limited circum-
stances. Those circumstances are where:
The real property on which the facility concerned is located was
acquired by the defendant after the disposal or placement of the
hazardous substances on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of
the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also estab-
lished by the defendant... :
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defend-
ant did not know, and had no reason to know, that any
hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or
threatened release was disposed of or on, in, or at the
facility;
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the
facility by escheat, or through any other involuntary trans-
fer or acquisition, or through the exercise of eminent do-
main authority by purchase or condemnation;
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or be-
quest. (Emphasis supplied).9
This exception, known as the "innocent landowner" defense,
will most commonly arise in the context of sales of real property
between two parties. Therefore, this article will focus on the cir-
cumstances contained in clause (1), above.
The critical burden that a landowner seeking coverage of the
"innocent landowner" defense will have to meet is that he "did not
know, and had no reason to know" of the presence of hazardous
substances on the property at the time it was acquired. The stan-
dard for meeting this burden is set forth in section 101(35)(B), 10
which states:
To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as pro-
vided in clause (i) of subparagraph (A) the defendant must have
undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry
into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent
with good commercial or customary practice in an effort to mini-
mize liability.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A).
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B).
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As to what may constitute "all appropriate inquiry," subsec-
tion (3) sets forth the following factors to be considered:
The court shall take into account any specialized knowledge or
experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the
purchase price to the value of the property, if contaminated,
commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about
the property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence
of contamination at the property, and the ability to detect such
contamination by appropriate inspection.
While no specific acts are set forth that might satisfy "all ap-
propriate inquiry," it would seem inherent in the language of sub-
section (B) that, 'at a minimum, a visual inspection of the property,
and a price reflective of current market values would be required.
In addition, the statute implies and the legislative history sup-
ports the position that persons who regularly engage in real estate
transactions (and who are thereby "sophisticated" purchasers of
property) are to be held to a higher standard than the infrequent
purchaser. The legislative history establishes a three-tier system:
commercial transactions are held to the highest standard; private
transactions are given more leniency; and inheritances and bequests
are treated most leniently.11
In summary, the statutory requirements for establishing the
"innocent landowner" defense, taking those contained in section
107(b)(3) and 101(35)(A) and (B) together, are:
(1) the hazardous substances involved in the release or threat of
release from the property must have been placed on the prop-
erty by a third party other than an employee, agent, or some-
one in direct or indirect contractual relationship (such as a
previous owner in the chain of title, a tenant,1 2 sublessee,1 3
etc.) with the landowner; or
(2)(a) if the third party was a previous owner of the property in
the chain of title with the current landowner, the landowner
must also show that he acquired the property after the dis-
posal of the hazardous substances, and
(b) the landowner did not know and had no reason to know of
the hazardous substances that are the subject of the release
11. 1986 U.S. Code Congressional & Admin. News, 3279-3280; U.S. v. Pacific Hide &
Fur, D. Idaho, Civ. No. 83-4052 (Order of March, 1989).
12. For liability of an owner for acts of disposal of hazardous substances by a tenant,
see U.S. v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
13. For liability of an owner for acts of disposal of hazardous substances by a sublessee,
see State of Washington v. Time Oil Co., W. D. Wash. Docket Nos. C85-478TB and C86-
990TB (Consolidated), Order of March 9, 1988, 17 CHEM. WASTE LITI. REP. 1261.
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by having made all appropriate inquiry into the previous
ownership and uses of the property consistent with good
commercial or customary practice;
(3) the landowner exercised due care with respect to the hazard-
ous substances upon their discovery; and
(4) the landowner took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of any third party and the consequences that could
foreseeably result from them.
Judicial Interpretations of the Innocent Landowner Defense
It is likely that, in most cases, the hazardous substances will
have been put on the property by a prior owner or other person
with whom the present owner has a contractual relationship.
Therefore, the issue most often in dispute in cases involving the "in-
nocent landowner" defense is whether the person asserting the de-
fense undertook "all appropriate inquiry" prior to acquiring the
property. A number of cases have been decided on that issue. In
keeping with Congress' intent that more sophisticated parties be
held to a higher standard of diligence, 4 the courts have generally
been more willing to find individuals entitled to the defense than
corporations. Indeed, one court has gone to great lengths to avoid
imposing CERCLA liability on individual landowners.
Several recent cases are illustrative.
In United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., I5 a corpora-
tion (McCarty's, Inc.)was formed in 1949 by Samuel McCarty to
operate a scrap metal recycling business on a parcel of land in Poca-
tello, Idaho. Samuel McCarty and his wife died in the 1960's, leav-
ing the stock in the corporation to their children, two of whom
(S.R. and William) continued the operations of the company, while
another child (Richard) owned stock but did not participate in the
business management. The stock of a fourth child was redeemed by
the company.
During the 1970's, capacitors containing PCB's were disposed
of in a pit on the property, many of which subsequently leaked. The
business remained in existence until 1982, by which time S.R. had
also died and William had given his stock to his children, none of
whom had been active in the management of the company. The
surviving shareholders then dissolved the corporation and distrib-
uted the assets in redemption of their stock.
14. See supra note 11.
15. U.S. v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., D. Idaho, Civ. No. 83-4052 (Opinion dated
Mar. 13, 1989).
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The EPA expended Superfund monies to clean up the site, and
then sued Richard and the remaining stockholders of the company
(grandchildren of the founder of the company) for reimbursement,
on the theory that they were the owners and operators of the facil-
ity. The defendants raised the "innocent landowner" defense. The
court noted that according to the legislative history of the statute,
commercial transactions were to be held to the strictest standard;
private transactions were given a little more leniency; and inheri-
tances and bequests were treated the most leniently of all. 16 The
court observed that this case was more like an inheritance than a
private transaction.
The government, however, argued that there was no evidence
that the defendants had conducted any inquiry into the environ-
mental condition of the property, and that Congress intended that
everyone, under any conceivable circumstances, must make some
inquiry about the existence of hazardous wastes when obtaining an
interest in property. The court rejected the government's argument,
replying that Congress could have made that requirement plain, but
did not do so. "Instead," the court said, "Congress used terms like
'appropriate' and 'reasonable' in describing the necessary inquiry."
This indicated to the court that "Congress was not laying down the
bright line rule asserted by the Government. Rather, Congress rec-
ognized that each case would be different and must be analyzed on
its facts."
The court held that under the facts of this case, the conduct of
the defendants was reasonable, and refused to hold them liable
under section 107(a)(1) as present owners and operators of the
property. The Government also claimed that they were liable under
section 107(a)(2) as past owners at the time of disposal of wastes on
the property, but the court ruled that it did not have sufficient evi-
dence before it to enable it to rule on that point.
Another major, but legally questionable, victory for the defense
occurred in United States v. Serafini,1 7 in which the Parmoff Corpo-
ration leased property in 1967 to the City of Scranton, Penn-
sylvania, for use as a landfill. At the time, Serifini was the secretary
of Parmoff Corp. In 1969, Parmoff Corp. sold the property to a
partnership composed of Serafini and other individuals. Over 1,000
55-gallon drums, many containing hazardous waste, were on the
site and apparent to view. The evidence indicated that the partners
who purchased the property did not conduct an on-site inspection,
16. See supra note 11.
17. U.S. v. Serafini, 706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
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nor did they examine photographs of the property showing the pres-
ence of the drums.
The Government conducted removal activities at the site, and
sued the partnership for recovery of its costs and to require addi-
tional remedial action to be taken at the site. The partners raised
the "innocent landowner" defense, and the principal issue was
whether they had conducted "all appropriate inquiry" at the time of
the purchase. The partners contended that the mere showing that
drums were visible was not sufficient to show that they knew or had
reason to know that hazardous substances had been deposited on
the property.
The Government answered that landowners cannot close their
eyes to hazardous waste problems, and that the reason the partners
had no knowledge of the drums was only because they failed to
inspect the property or make any inquiry into past use of the site.
The Government also contended that the existence of a landfill on
the property should give the partners reason to know of the exist-
ence of hazardous wastes on the property.
The court, while characterizing the Government's arguments
as "tempting", brushed them aside. After referring to the factors
listed in section 101(35)(B) to be considered in determing whether a
party has undertaken "all appropriate inquiry" (but not analyzing
the evidence in light of those factors), the court simply stated:
"[T]he court is unable to find that the defendants' inaction was in-
appropriate under the facts of this case. The Government has
presented no evidence from which the court can conclude that the
defendants' failure to inspect or inquire was inconsistent with good
commercial or customary practice."' 8
The court also rejected the Government's argument that
Serafini, having signed the lease to the City of Scranton on behalf of
Parmoff Corp., demonstrated that the partnership had notice of the
site's previous use. The court answered that Serafini claimed to be
serving only as Acting Secretary, that he had no knowledge of the
operations or management of the company, and that he executed
the lease only as a witness to the signatures of other officers of the
corporation. The court also characterized as "somewhat tenuous"
the Government's assertion that knowledge of the existence of a
landfill on the premises was reason to know of the existence of haz-
ardous waste on the premises.
While the Pacific Hide and Fur decision may be supported by a
18. Id. at 347.
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fair reading of the relevant provisions in the statute and the legisla-
tive history, the Serafini case failed to reconcile the facts of that case
with the requirements of the innocent landowner defense, and
seems to make a mockery of the requirement that the purchaser of
property make "all appropriate inquiry" into the previous uses of
the property as provided in section 101(35)(B). Serafini may be an
extreme example of the reluctance of courts to subject individuals to
the potentially devastating liability of CERCLA. Purchasers would
be well advised to limit their reliance upon it in guiding their prop-
erty acquisition activities.
On the other side of the ledger, several courts have denied pur-
chasers the status of "innocent landowners", and all of the persons
claiming that status have been corporations. 19
In The State of Washington v. Time Oil Co.,2° the defense was
not upheld where the defendant's sub-lessee apparently caused the
contamination, and the defendant failed to present specific facts to
indicate that some other party having no contractual relationship
with defendant was solely responsible for releasing all of the hazard-
ous substances.
In Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc.,2 the defendant un-
successfully attempted to claim the "innocent landowner" defense
when the evidence showed that the source of contamination was a
one million cubic foot pile of smelting slag at the site which con-
tained heavy metals, and that the defendant was aware, prior to the
purchase, that the state environmental agency was concerned about
the leaching of metals from the pile.
Finally, two cases demonstrate the importance of observing the
requirement to exercise "due care" with respect to the hazardous
substances, and the duty to take precautions against foreseeable acts
or omissions of third parties as required by section 107(b)(3)(a).
In United States v. Sharon Steel Co.,22 the State of Utah, which
had acquired a right-of-way which included part of the property
19. For a case illustrating the court's willingness to permit a corporation to argue the
innocent landowner defense, see PVO International, Inc. v. Drew Chemical Corp., D.N.J.,
Civil Docket No. 87-3921 (Opinion dated June 27, 1988), 16 CWLR 669, in which the court
refused to grant a motion for summary judgement that PVO was not an innocent purchaser
of a portion of a chemical manufacturing facility merely because PVO is a chemical manufac-
turer, and thus, according to the defendant (seller of the facility to PVO) should have known
that the facility would have hazardous substances at the site.
20. See supra note 13.
21. Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, N.D. Cal. Docket No. C-83-5906-SC, (Opinion
dated Feb. 23, 1988) 15 CHEM. WAsTE LITIG. REP. 1225.
22. U.S. v. Sharon Steel Co., D. Utah, Civ. No. 86-C-0924J (Opinion dated July 13,
1988).
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from which a release or threat of release existed, was not entitled to
the benefit of the "innocent landowner" defense even though the
release did not show that the state exercised due care with respect to
mill tailings on its right-of-way.
And in United States v. Monsanto Co.,23 the owner leased the
site to a chemical manufacturing company for the purpose of the
latter's storing raw materials and finished chemical products. The
lessee subsequently expanded its business to include recycling of
waste chemicals, and used the site as a waste storage and disposal
facility. The court denied the owner the "innocent landowner" de-
fense, stating that not only did a contractual relationship exist, but
the owner, knowing the business of the tenant, took no precaution-
ary action against the foreseeable conduct of the tenant, never in-
specting the property during the lease. "In our view, the statute
does not sanction such willful or negligent blindness on the part of
absentee owners."
It is a fair assumption that, with the notoriety that CERCLA
liability has received in the real estate, financial, and corporate cir-
cles across the country, the standard of care in acquiring real prop-
erty is consistently rising. The Pacific Hide & Fur and Serafini
cases to the contrary notwithstanding, persons who purchase or
otherwise acquire commercial or industrial property without having
conducted an environmental assessment of that property will un-
doubtedly have a most difficult time sustaining the "innocent land-
owner" defense, especially if those persons frequently deal in the
real estate market.
Proposed Legislative Definition of "'All Appropriate Inquiry"
The potential liability which may be assumed under CERCLA
by ownership of property, and the uncertainties of knowing what
actions may constitute "all appropriate inquiry" to avoid that liabil-
ity, have led to the introduction of H.R. 2787 in the U.S. House of
Representatives by Congressman Weldon and others. The bill, enti-
tled the "Innocent Landowner Defense Amendment of 1989",
would amend section 101(35) by adding a new subsection (C). That
subsection would provide a landowner with a rebuttable presump-
tion that he has made all appropriate inquiry within the meaning of
subsection (3) if a "Phase 1" environmental audit was conducted
immediately prior to or at the time of acquisition of the property.
A Phase 1 audit is defined as a review of the property, con-
23. U.S. v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
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ducted by "environmental professionals"'24 consisting of a review of
each of the following sources of information:
(1) recorded chain of title documents (all deeds, easements, leases,
restrictions and covenants) for a period of fifty years;
(2) aerial photographs reflecting prior use, and which are reason-
ably obtainable through state or local government agencies;
(3) determination of the existence of environmental cleanup liens
against the property which have arisen pursuant to Federal,
State, and local laws;
(4) reasonably obtainable federal, state, or local government
records of sites where there has been a release of hazardous
substances, and which are likely to cause or contribute to a
release or threat of release on the property under examination;
(5) a visual site inspection of the property, its improvements, and
the property immediately adjacent to it, to determine the obvi-
ousness of the presence or likely presence of a release or threat
of release of hazardous substances.
The rebuttable presumption created by the audit does not arise
unless the owner maintains a compilation of the information devel-
oped during the audit. In addition, the presumption does not arise
if the audit discloses the presence or likely presence of a release or
threat thereof unless the owner has taken reasonable steps to con-
firm the absence of such release or threat.
This bill would seem to establish reasonable, but not overly
stringent, standards which are currently incorporated into may en-
vironmental audits, and it should have the support of real estate,
corporate interests, and consulting firms. Perhaps unavoidably, it
also raises additional questions, such as what documents are "rea-
sonably obtainable" from federal, state, and local agencies, what are
"obvious" indications of the presence or likely presence of a release,
and what are "reasonable steps" to be taken to confirm that absence
of a release or threat thereof of an audit discloses the likely presence
of a release?
All of these issues are likely to be raised by the government in
contesting the claim of a landowner to a presumption of innocence.
Nevertheless, the amendment does go a long way to solve the larger
problems of clarifying what constitutes "all appropriate inquiry"
necessary to sustain the innocent landowner defense.
24. Environmental professionals are defined as an individual, or an entity managed or
controlled by such individual, who, through academic training, occupational experience and
reputation (such as engineers, environmental consultants and attorneys), can objectively con-
duct one or more aspects of a Phase I Environmental Audit.
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Section 122(g)(1)(B) De Minimis Landowner Liability
As noted earlier in this article, there is a second statutory pro-
vision that a landowner who acquired property without knowledge
of contamination may use to minimize, if not altogether avoid,
CERCLA liability. CERCLA section 122(g)25 addresses the man-
ner in which potentially responsible parties (PRPs) whose liabilities
may be considered de minimis, or minimal, may be settled as expe-
ditiously as possible. Two classes of de minimis parties are men-
tioned, one relating to persons who contributed small amounts of
waste to the site, and the other to owners of the property.
With regard to the latter group, section 122(g) provides as
follows:
(1) EXPEDITED FINAL SETTLEMENT - Whenever prac-
ticable and in the public interest ... the [EPA] shall as
promptly as possible reach a final settlement with a poten-
tially responsible party in an administrative or civil action
... if such a settlement involves only a minor portion of the
response costs at the facility concerned and.., the condi-
tions in ... subparagraph... (B) are met:
(B) the potentially responsible party
(i) is the owner of the real property on or in which the facility
is located;
(ii) did not conduct or permit the generation, transportation,
storage, treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance
at the facility; and
(iii) did not contribute to the release or threat of release of a
hazardous substance at the facility through any action or
omission.
This subparagraph (B) does not apply if the [PRP] purchased the
real property with actual or constructive knowledge that the
property was used for the generation, transportation, storage,
treatment, or disposal of any hazardous substance.
While this section is similar to the defense afforded to the inno-
cent landowner under section 107(b)(3), it is this writer's opinion
that they are not the same, and that distinctions can and should be
made between them.
Section 107(b)(3) provides a defense to liability, assuming that
the rather stringent requirements of that section and the "all appro-
priate inquiry" requirements of section 101(35)(A) and (B) can be
met by the landowner. In other words, the defense is reserved for
25. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g).
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those who can demonstrate that they are "pure as new-fallen snow"
(putting aside acid rain considerations).
On the other hand, section 122(g)(1)(B) recognizes that there
will be those purchasers of property who, while they were unaware
of the presence of hazardous substances on the property at the time
of purchase, may not be able to show that they conducted "all ap-
propriate inquiry" into the past uses and ownership of the property,
such as those who are as "pure as New York snow" (with apologies
to New York City), and are therefore unable to satisfy the require-
ments of sections 107(b)(3) and 101(35).
While the latter group of PRPs may be liable, Congress un-
doubtedly believed that they should not be subjected to the full
brunt of strict, joint and several liability, but instead should be
treated as de minimis PRPs, and allowed to resolve their liability for
a relatively nominal payment. Thus, the distinction between the
complete defense under section 107, and the de minimis treatment
of "partially-innocent" landowners under section 122(g). The EPA,
however, does not seem to recognize this distinction in a meaningful
way, as we shall see in the next section.
EPA Guidance in Landowner Liability Under Sections 107
and 122
EPA headquarters has recently issued a sweeping guidance
document to its regional offices in the subjects of the innocent land-
owner defense under section 107(b)(3), settlement with de minimis
innocent landowners under section 122(g)(1)(B), and settlement
with prospective purchaser of contaminated property26 (the "Gui-
dance"). Not surprisingly, the EPA takes a very restrictive view of
the innocent landowner defense, but as a result its Guidance is
misguided.
Rather than recognize that CERCLA recognizes two classes of
innocent landowners, the EPA attempts to link the section
107(b)(3) defense with the de minimis settlement authority con-
tained in section 122(g). The EPA apparently does not discriminate
between the levels of due diligence separating one from the other.
Instead, the EPA merges the two, and a bastard results in which all
26. Memorandum dated June 6, 1989, from Edward E. Reich, Acting Assistant Admin-
istrator for Enforcement and Compliance Monitoring and Jonathon Z. Cannon, Acting As-
sistant Administrator for Solid Waste and Emergency Response to Regional Administrators,
entitled "Guidance on Landowner Liability under § 107(a)(1) of CERCLA, De Minimis Set-
tlements under § 122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements with Prospective Purchasers of
Contaminated Property."
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"innocent landowners" are treated as if they were de minimis PRPs
under section 122(g), which assumes liability on the part of the
owner, and, according to the Guidance, enables the EPA to dictate
some rather onerous provisions against the owner in a consent order
or decree.
This position is evidenced in, among other portions of the Gui-
dance document, the following passage:
[A] person who acquires already contaminated property and who
can satisfy the remaining requirements of Section 101(35) as well
as those of Section 107(b)(3) may be able to establish a defense to
liability. Although this is an affirmative defense, for which the
defendant bears the burden of proof, Congress has provided a
settlement mechanism which the Agency may use in its discre-
tion for settlement purposes to resolve the liability of certain
landowners prior to or in the early stages of litigation through
the application of the de minimis settlement provisions of Section
122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA. 7
Not only does the Guidance attempt to treat innocent land-
owners under section 107(b)(3) and section 122(g)(1)(B) the same,
but it incorporates the more stringent requirements of the section
107(b)(3) defense into the requirements that a PRP landowner must
meet to qualify for de minimis treatment under section
122(g)(1)(B), so that, in effect, there is only one set of requirements
- the most stringent - for "innocent landowner" status. For
example, the Guidance states:
The requirements which must be satisfied in order for the
Agency to consider a settlement with the landowners under the
de minimis settlement provisions of section 122(g)(1)(B) are sub-
stantially the same as the elements which must be proved at trial
in order for a landowner to establish a third party defense under
section 107(b)(3) and section 101(35).28
The foregoing statement is accompanied by a footnote which
states: "Even though the language in Sections 122(g)(1)(B) and
101(35) is not identical, the scope of the two provisions is substan-
tially the same." This writer submits that the scope of the two sec-
tions are not the same, and the reason the language of the two
sections is not identical is because Congress intended that there be a
defense for landowners who conducted "all appropriate inquiry"
when they purchased contaminated property, but liability (albeit a
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id. at 7.
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de mininis version) for those purchasers who were unaware of the
contamination, but did not exercise "all appropriate inquiry."
This distinction is important to both classes of landowners.
Aside from the unjustified position of requiring 122(g)(1)(B) de
minimis landowners to meet the more stringent requirements of a
107(b)(3) defense, the EPA proposes to require all innocent land-
owners to enter into a consent administrative order or consent de-
cree. An innocent landowner with a clear 107(b)(3) defense to
liability arguably should not be subjected to an administrative order
or decree involving considerable time and money. They will con-
tain provisions to which a non-liable party should not be subjected.
For example, the EPA will usually attempt to obtain a cash
payment from the landowner in return for a covenant not to sue. In
all cases, the landowner must agree to provide access to the site, and
cooperation with the EPA and its remedial contractors in any ac-
tions they may take on the property. Furthermore, the EPA will
require the innocent landowner to release any claims or causes of
action he may have against the U.S. or the Superfund arising from
work performed or expenses incurred at the site. Finally, the Gui-
dance document requires that "reopeners" for liability be included
in the agreement, and that in the event the EPA should assert any
claims against the landowner subsequent to the settlement, the bur-
den of proof would be on the landowner to show that any release or
threat of release that is the subject of the claim is attributable solely
to conditions existing at the time of the settlement.
To subject those two classes of persons to the same standard
and to the same procedures is a misinterpretation of the statute, will
work injustices to both categories of innocent landowners, and will
inhibit settlements with both categories.
Establishing the Innocent Landowner Defense
The potential for CERCLA liability has brought about
profound changes in the way commercial and industrial properties
should be acquired. Paraphrasing the Proverb at the beginning of
this article, one who rushes into a real estate acquisition without
taking care to avoid potential environmental liabilities is likely to be
neither innocent nor rich for very long if the property contains haz-
ardous substances. Instead, CERCLA and other laws imposing
strict liability upon property owners dictate that each commercial
and industrial real estate acquisition be handled with the innocent
landowner defense in mind.
As the widely divergent judicial decisions discussed above illus-
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trate, there is not a uniform standard for the "all appropriate in-
quiry" necessary to qualify a purchaser as an innocent landowner
for purposes of the CERCLA section 107(b)(3) defense. Should
H.R. 2787 be enacted into law, it would provide specific acts, the
fulfillment of which would qualify a purchaser for the defense, and
narrow the issues considerably. Until then, purchasers of property
are well advised to err on the side of caution, and take measures
which will, as clearly as can be determined at this time, be recog-
nized as "all appropriate inquiry."
Those measures should include obtaining knowledgeable envi-
ronmental counsel and technical expertise in planning acquisition
activities. Because all properties are all somewhat different, and
have been subjected to different uses, the activities which will be
required to satisfy the "all appropriate inquiry" standard will differ
somewhat from site to site, requiring expert advice on the most suit-
able approach for each site.
Generally speaking, however, it would seem that, at a mini-
mum, what has come to be known as a Phase I environmental audit
should satisfy the requirements of CERCLA section 101(35)(B),
and qualify the purchaser for the innocent landowner defense under
107(b)(3). The conduct of such an audit is generally considered to
be good commercial practice, and includes:
(1) a title search to determine the history of ownership (and, to a
limited extent, use) of the property;
(2) a review of documents of federal, state, and local agencies hav-
ing jurisdiction over environmental matters in the geographic
area in which the property is located;
(3) a review of aerial photographs of the property, and adjoining
property, for a reasonable period of time (e.g., 30 years) to ob-
serve previous uses of the property;
(4) a site inspection of the property to determine whether hazard-
ous substances or wastes, or manifestations thereof, are appar-
ent or suspected due to present or past uses of the property.
Because of the potential for migration of substances, adjoining
property and its history of use should also be examined. If
cause exists to suspect that the property may be contaminated,
preliminary soil and groundwater tests should be conducted;
and
(5) interviews should be conducted with persons who are familiar
with the history of use of the property and adjoining property.
Persons interviewed should include neighbors of the property
and present and former employees of any facility located on
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the property and adjoining property regarding.waste disposal
practices.29
Should contamination be found on the property (or adjoining
property), the purchaser will not, as to that contamination, be "in-
nocent," but the issue of whether the prospective purchaser wants
to proceed with the acquisition, and if so, who is responsible for the
costs of cleanup, can be addressed in the contract. In addition, as-
suming the audit is done in a professional manner, it will allow the
purchaser to claim the "innocent landowner" defense as to any
other hazardous substances not detected by the audit.3°
Such an audit would presumably satisfy at least three of the
five factors set forth in CERCLA 101(35)(B) that courts must con-
sider in assessing whether "all appropriate inquiry" has been con-
ducted. The other two factors are less objective, but one of them -
any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the owner
claiming the defense - would likely be rendered academic by the
purchaser conducting a state-of-the-art audit. The fifth factor (the
relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if
uncontaminated) would appear to apply to transactions where the
purchase price is so far below the market value of comparable prop-
erty in the vicinity that almost any purchaser would be put on no-
tice of a defect in the property.
Conclusion
The possibility of assuming CERCLA's potentially devastating
liability simply through- the ownership of property has brought
about profound changes in the procedures to be followed in the ac-
quisition of commercial and industrial properties. Today's prudent
purchaser will establish the groundwork for the innocent landowner
defense by making all appropriate inquiry into previous uses of the
property. The cost of conducting such an inquiry is one that most
purchasers are not accustomed to paying, and they may chafe at the
added expense, but it is the best insurance against loss that can be
bought.
Until Congress enacts legislation to clarify what actions are en-
29. For a detailed discussion of environmental auditing, selecting an audit firm, and
maintaining confidentiality of an audit report, see Mays, A Practical Guide to Environmental
Due Diligence In Real Estate Transactions, 10 HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT, No. 14, at 11
(March 13, 1989) or write to the author for a complimentary copy.
30. See CERCLA § 101(35)(A)(i), which provides that the innocent landowner defense
is available if, at the time of acquisition, "the defendant did not know, and had no reason to
know, that any hazardous substance which is the subject of the release or threatened release
was disposed of on, in, or at the facility."
1990]
40 ' COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY L4WJO URNAL
compassed within "all appropriate inquiry" into past uses of prop-
erty, the standard will continue to be uncertain. Because of the loss
potential, the prudent purchaser should go to whatever extent nec-
essary to reasonably determine that the property is free of contami-
nants. If the property is found to be contaminated and,
notwithstanding that, the prospective purchaser wants the property,
it is equally important that the nature and extent of the contamina-
tion be determined.
Should the purchaser be unfortunate enough to purchase con-
taminated property, despite having made all appropriate inquiry,
the EPA can be counted on not to be overly sympathetic. Charged
as it is with the responsibility to clean up hazardous waste sites, and
not too concerned about who, among the four classes of responsible
parties should pay for it, the EPA is likely to attempt to wrest some
money as well as other concessions from the owner, no matter how
innocent he may be. If negotiations with the EPA prove fruitless,
the landowner can take hope in recourse to the courts, who have
shown mercy to the innocent landowner on occasion, especially
where the owner is an individual.
Recourse to the courts, however, is an expensive and uncertain
last resort. It is obviously far better to invest in a comprehensive
environmental audit and title search, using a qualified technical
consulting firm and experienced legal counsel, to detect any
problems, and plan how to deal with them. Information gained
thereby will enable the prospective purchaser to quantify the risks
- insofar as that is possible in the inexact science which is waste
site cleanup - and to come to an informed decision about whether
to purchase the property, and if so, upon what terms and condi-
tions. It will also enable the purchaser to claim that most blessed
state of innocence as to any undiscovered contamination.
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